Suck My Glock
Member
It never made sense to me how/why there was no Secret Service eye in the sky at the Butler, PA. rally.
Supposedly, that is now answered.
https://nypost.com/2024/09/25/us-news/inexperienced-secret-service-agent-called-tech-support-hotline-for-help-piloting-drone-ahead-of-trump-rally-shooting-bombshell-report/
Inexperienced Secret Service agent called tech support hotline for help piloting drone ahead of Trump rally shooting: bombshell report
A preliminary report on the July 13 assassination attempt on former President Trump from the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs ripped into newly revealed missteps that went into the Secret Service’s planning and execution of security at the event during which a spectator was killed, two others were seriously wounded and the GOP candidate was struck on the ear.
Among the key failures, [highlight=yellow]an agent inexperienced with drone equipment called a toll-free tech support hotline for help after a request ahead of time for additional unmanned assets was denied[/highlight], according to a preliminary summary of findings made public Wednesday. [highlight=yellow]According to the committee, he had just an hour of informal training with the device.[/highlight]
“Multiple foreseeable and preventable planning and operational failures by USSS contributed to [Thomas] Crooks’ ability to carry out the assassination attempt of former President Trump on July 13,” the preliminary report read. “These included unclear roles and responsibilities, insufficient coordination with state and local law enforcement, the lack of effective communications, and inoperable C-UAS systems, among many others.”
“We have reviewed the interim report on the attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump. The weight of our mission is not lost on us and in this hyperdynamic threat environment, the U.S. Secret Service cannot fail. Many of the insights gained from the Senate report align with the findings from our mission assurance review and are essential to ensuring that what happened on July 13 never happens again,” U.S. Secret Service Chief of Communications Anthony Guglielmi responded Wednesday.
According to testimony from agents from Trump’s detail and the Pittsburgh field office, neither of them were aware at the time when, 27 minutes before the shooting, the Secret Service’s security room and counter-sniper team was informed that a suspicious person had been spotted near the AGR building with a range finder; the shooter eventually took position on the roof of that building.
“Shortly before shots were fired, a USSS counter sniper saw local law enforcement running toward the AGR building with their guns drawn, but he did not alert former President Trump’s protective detail to remove him from the stage,” the committee revealed in the 94-page report. “The USSS counter sniper told the Committee that while seeing officers with their guns drawn ‘elevated’ the threat level, the thought to notify someone to get Trump off the stage ‘did not cross [his] mind.’”
The fact that Secret Service counter snipers had been deployed at all was unique, according to the report. Their addition to the rally’s security plans had come in response to “credible intelligence” of a potential threat. Typically, an out-of-office candidate would not have a counter-sniper team before the party’s nominating convention, and the RNC did not begin until two days after the shooting.
Local law enforcement raised concerns ahead of the rally about the AGR building across the field from where Trump would take the stage days before the rally, but its rooftop remained unsecured.
[highlight=yellow]Advance agents on Trump’s detail had also requested additional resources ahead of time, including additional drone equipment and additional counter-assault agents to act as liaisons with local SWAT teams.
“These requests were denied, at times without explanation,” the committee found.[/highlight]
[highlight=yellow]Additionally, the agent in charge of drone equipment available on scene ran into technical difficulty that prevented them from flying the drone until after Crooks flew his own near the rally site.[/highlight]
The report delved deeper into Acting Director Ronald Rowe’s admission last week that communications shortcomings delayed vital information in the moments before the shooting. Secret Service members apparently faced a number of technical problems with their radios, and the special agent in charge of the Pittsburgh field office did not have a radio at all because he handed it to the lead advance agent on Trump’s detail.
Another key failure the committee criticized was the lack of a clear chain of command. Officials involved in scouting and planning for the rally “denied that they were individually responsible for planning or security failures and deflected blame,” according to the committee.
“I don’t approve anything,” the lead advance agent was quoted as telling senators. “I clearly just take the information that they [the USSS site agent and USSS site counterpart] have recommended and put together with the other information that’s put together from the other advance entities, and those are all submitted to the field office and then submitted to the Trump detail, the candidate nominations operations, and then they go further to headquarters.”
The committee is recommending better coordination and clearer leadership, including the designation of a single person to approve security plans, functional communication between federal agents and their local counterparts, additional intelligence assets and other resources.
Local law enforcement assets stationed inside the AGR building were not tasked with securing its roof but rather with protecting the crowd, according to the committee. Local sharpshooters inside could have seen the area of the roof from where Crooks opened fire, but they would have needed to go into a different room without a clear view of the crowd.
Additionally, the local officers inside were designated as “snipers,” whose role was to look over the crowd from a concealed position as supposed to “counter snipers” scanning potential vantage points for threats from assailants like Crooks, according to the committee.
Guglielmi continued, “The U.S. Secret Service has implemented changes to our protective operations including elevating the protective posture for our protectees and bolstering our protective details as appropriate in order to ensure the highest levels of safety and security for those we protect. As Acting Director Ronald L. Rowe said during press conferences on Sept. 16 and Sept. 20, former President Donald Trump is receiving the highest level of protection that the U.S. Secret Service can provide, and we will continue to evaluate and adjust our specific protective measures and methodology based on each location and situation. We are also diligently examining long-term solutions to challenges such as enhancing communications and interoperability with our federal, state and local partners to make sure our coordinated efforts during protective events are seamless.”
The July 13 attack on a rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, was the first of two attempts on Trump’s life over the summer. A counter sniper returned fire and killed suspect Matthew Thomas Crooks, 20.
In the second attempt, 58-year-old suspect Ryan Routh was arrested on Sept. 15 after a Secret Service agent saw someone pointing a rifle out of the tree line at the edge of the Trump International Golf Club in West Palm Beach, Florida, as the former president was golfing there.
Supposedly, that is now answered.
https://nypost.com/2024/09/25/us-news/inexperienced-secret-service-agent-called-tech-support-hotline-for-help-piloting-drone-ahead-of-trump-rally-shooting-bombshell-report/
Inexperienced Secret Service agent called tech support hotline for help piloting drone ahead of Trump rally shooting: bombshell report
A preliminary report on the July 13 assassination attempt on former President Trump from the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs ripped into newly revealed missteps that went into the Secret Service’s planning and execution of security at the event during which a spectator was killed, two others were seriously wounded and the GOP candidate was struck on the ear.
Among the key failures, [highlight=yellow]an agent inexperienced with drone equipment called a toll-free tech support hotline for help after a request ahead of time for additional unmanned assets was denied[/highlight], according to a preliminary summary of findings made public Wednesday. [highlight=yellow]According to the committee, he had just an hour of informal training with the device.[/highlight]
“Multiple foreseeable and preventable planning and operational failures by USSS contributed to [Thomas] Crooks’ ability to carry out the assassination attempt of former President Trump on July 13,” the preliminary report read. “These included unclear roles and responsibilities, insufficient coordination with state and local law enforcement, the lack of effective communications, and inoperable C-UAS systems, among many others.”
“We have reviewed the interim report on the attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump. The weight of our mission is not lost on us and in this hyperdynamic threat environment, the U.S. Secret Service cannot fail. Many of the insights gained from the Senate report align with the findings from our mission assurance review and are essential to ensuring that what happened on July 13 never happens again,” U.S. Secret Service Chief of Communications Anthony Guglielmi responded Wednesday.
According to testimony from agents from Trump’s detail and the Pittsburgh field office, neither of them were aware at the time when, 27 minutes before the shooting, the Secret Service’s security room and counter-sniper team was informed that a suspicious person had been spotted near the AGR building with a range finder; the shooter eventually took position on the roof of that building.
“Shortly before shots were fired, a USSS counter sniper saw local law enforcement running toward the AGR building with their guns drawn, but he did not alert former President Trump’s protective detail to remove him from the stage,” the committee revealed in the 94-page report. “The USSS counter sniper told the Committee that while seeing officers with their guns drawn ‘elevated’ the threat level, the thought to notify someone to get Trump off the stage ‘did not cross [his] mind.’”
The fact that Secret Service counter snipers had been deployed at all was unique, according to the report. Their addition to the rally’s security plans had come in response to “credible intelligence” of a potential threat. Typically, an out-of-office candidate would not have a counter-sniper team before the party’s nominating convention, and the RNC did not begin until two days after the shooting.
Local law enforcement raised concerns ahead of the rally about the AGR building across the field from where Trump would take the stage days before the rally, but its rooftop remained unsecured.
[highlight=yellow]Advance agents on Trump’s detail had also requested additional resources ahead of time, including additional drone equipment and additional counter-assault agents to act as liaisons with local SWAT teams.
“These requests were denied, at times without explanation,” the committee found.[/highlight]
[highlight=yellow]Additionally, the agent in charge of drone equipment available on scene ran into technical difficulty that prevented them from flying the drone until after Crooks flew his own near the rally site.[/highlight]
The report delved deeper into Acting Director Ronald Rowe’s admission last week that communications shortcomings delayed vital information in the moments before the shooting. Secret Service members apparently faced a number of technical problems with their radios, and the special agent in charge of the Pittsburgh field office did not have a radio at all because he handed it to the lead advance agent on Trump’s detail.
Another key failure the committee criticized was the lack of a clear chain of command. Officials involved in scouting and planning for the rally “denied that they were individually responsible for planning or security failures and deflected blame,” according to the committee.
“I don’t approve anything,” the lead advance agent was quoted as telling senators. “I clearly just take the information that they [the USSS site agent and USSS site counterpart] have recommended and put together with the other information that’s put together from the other advance entities, and those are all submitted to the field office and then submitted to the Trump detail, the candidate nominations operations, and then they go further to headquarters.”
The committee is recommending better coordination and clearer leadership, including the designation of a single person to approve security plans, functional communication between federal agents and their local counterparts, additional intelligence assets and other resources.
Local law enforcement assets stationed inside the AGR building were not tasked with securing its roof but rather with protecting the crowd, according to the committee. Local sharpshooters inside could have seen the area of the roof from where Crooks opened fire, but they would have needed to go into a different room without a clear view of the crowd.
Additionally, the local officers inside were designated as “snipers,” whose role was to look over the crowd from a concealed position as supposed to “counter snipers” scanning potential vantage points for threats from assailants like Crooks, according to the committee.
Guglielmi continued, “The U.S. Secret Service has implemented changes to our protective operations including elevating the protective posture for our protectees and bolstering our protective details as appropriate in order to ensure the highest levels of safety and security for those we protect. As Acting Director Ronald L. Rowe said during press conferences on Sept. 16 and Sept. 20, former President Donald Trump is receiving the highest level of protection that the U.S. Secret Service can provide, and we will continue to evaluate and adjust our specific protective measures and methodology based on each location and situation. We are also diligently examining long-term solutions to challenges such as enhancing communications and interoperability with our federal, state and local partners to make sure our coordinated efforts during protective events are seamless.”
The July 13 attack on a rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, was the first of two attempts on Trump’s life over the summer. A counter sniper returned fire and killed suspect Matthew Thomas Crooks, 20.
In the second attempt, 58-year-old suspect Ryan Routh was arrested on Sept. 15 after a Secret Service agent saw someone pointing a rifle out of the tree line at the edge of the Trump International Golf Club in West Palm Beach, Florida, as the former president was golfing there.
